When President Vladimir Putin launched his war on February 24 after months of rallies on the Ukrainian border, he sent hundreds of helicopter commanders — the best of Russia’s best special forces soldiers — to attack and occupy a lightly defensive airfield. of Kiev. Other Russian forces have hit elsewhere across Ukraine, including in the eastern city of Kharkiv and in the disputed Donbass region and along the Black Sea coast. But as the seat of national power, Kyiv was the main prize. Thus the impetus from the elite airborne forces in the hours of the start of the war. But Putin failed to achieve his goal of quickly crushing Ukraine’s over-armed and over-numbered army. The Russians were ill-prepared for the Ukrainian resistance, proved incapable of adapting to the regressions, failed to effectively combine air and ground operations, misjudged Ukraine’s ability to defend its skies, and confounded of supplies. “This is a very bad combination if you want to conquer a country,” said Peter Mansoor, a retired army colonel and professor of military history at Ohio State University. At least for now, Putin’s forces have withdrawn from Kyiv, in eastern Ukraine. Eventually, the Russian leader may achieve some of his goals. However, his failure to capture Kyiv will be remembered for a long time – for how he defied pre-war expectations and revealed astonishing weaknesses to a military man believed to be one of the strongest in the world. “It’s amazing,” said Frederick Kagan, a military historian at the Institute for War Studies. On the first morning of the war, Russian Mi-8 attack helicopters were launched south of Kyiv on a mission to attack Hostomel Airport in the northwestern suburbs of the capital. Occupying the airport, also known as Antonov Airport, the Russians planned to build a base from which more troops and light armored vehicles would fly close to the heart of the country’s largest city. It did not work that way. Several Russian helicopters were reported to have been hit by missiles even before they reached Hostomel, and as soon as they landed at the airport they suffered heavy artillery fire losses. An attempt to take control of a military air base in Vasylkiv, south of Kiev, also met with fierce resistance, and reportedly saw several Russian Il-76 heavy transport aircraft carrying paratroopers being shot down by the Ukrainian defense. Although the Russians finally managed to take control of Hostomel Airport, the fierce resistance of the Ukrainians in the area of the capital forced the reconsideration of an invasion plan based on the expectation that the Ukrainians would expand quickly, the West would sway and Russian forces would have easy fight. Air strike missions behind enemy lines, such as the one at Hostomel, are dangerous and difficult, as the U.S. military showed on March 24, 2003, when it sent more than 30 Apache attack helicopters to Iraq from Kuwait to strike. a division of the Iraqi Democratic Guard. On their way, the Apaches encountered light weapons and anti-aircraft fire that shot down one of the helicopters, caused damage to others and forced the mission to be canceled. Even so, the US military recovered from this setback and soon occupied Baghdad. The fact that the attack on Hostomel by the Russian Special Purpose Airborne Brigade of the Russian 45th Guard could not have stood out in retrospect if the wider Russian effort had improved from that point. But he did not. The Russians conducted small and unsuccessful searches in the heart of Kiev and later tried at great cost to encircle the capital by pulling the bow further west. Against huge odds, the Ukrainians held their ground and retaliated, blocking the Russians and effectively using a wide range of Western weapons, including Javelin handguns, Stinger anti-aircraft missiles and more. Last week the Russians left Hostomel Airport as part of a major retreat in Belarus and Russia. A side light of the battle for Kyiv was the widely told story of a Russian refueling truck that stretched tens of miles along a main road to the capital. At first it seemed a worrying sign for the Ukrainians, but they managed to attack elements of the escort, which had limited off-road capability and thus eventually disbanded or otherwise became inactive in battle. “They never really supplied any value to the Russian forces that were gathering around Kyiv, they never helped them,” said Pentagon spokesman John Kirby. “The Ukrainians stopped this escort very quickly, as they were very agile, hitting bridges, hitting lead vehicles and stopping their movement.” Mansoor says the Russians underestimated the number of troops they would need and showed “astonishing inability” to perform basic military operations. They misjudged what it would take to win the battle for Kyiv, he says. “This would be difficult even if the Russian army had proved capable,” he said. “It has been proven that he is completely incapable of waging a modern armored war.” Putin was not the only one surprised by the initial failures of his military. The Americans and other Western officials had realized that if the invasion took place, Russia’s seemingly superior forces would cross the Ukrainian army like a hot knife into the butter. They may occupy Kyiv in a few days and the whole country in a few weeks, although some analysts have questioned whether Putin estimated how much Ukrainian forces had gained from Western training intensified after Putin’s occupation of Crimea in 2014 and invasion of Donbass. On March 25, just one month after the invasion began, the Russians said they had achieved their goals in the Kiev region and would move to the separatist Donbas region in eastern Ukraine. Some suspected a ploy by Putin to save time without abandoning his maximalist goals, but within days Kiev’s retreat was fully visible. Putin may even be able to refocus his war effort on a narrower goal of expanding Russian control of Donbas and possibly securing a land corridor from Donbas to the Crimean peninsula. But its failure in Kyiv has revealed weaknesses that suggest Russia is unlikely to try again soon to overthrow the national capital. “I think they learned their lesson,” Mansoor said.
title: “Russia S Failure To Take Down Kyiv Was A Defeat For The Ages " ShowToc: true date: “2022-12-06” author: “Jessica Simms”
When President Vladimir Putin launched his war on February 24 after months of rallies on the Ukrainian border, he sent hundreds of helicopter commanders — the best of Russia’s best special forces soldiers — to attack and occupy a lightly defensive airfield. of Kiev. Other Russian forces have hit elsewhere across Ukraine, including in the eastern city of Kharkiv and in the disputed Donbass region and along the Black Sea coast. But as the seat of national power, Kyiv was the main prize. Thus the impetus from the elite airborne forces in the hours of the start of the war. But Putin failed to achieve his goal of quickly crushing Ukraine’s over-armed and over-numbered army. The Russians were ill-prepared for the Ukrainian resistance, proved incapable of adapting to the regressions, failed to effectively combine air and ground operations, misjudged Ukraine’s ability to defend its skies, and confounded of supplies. “This is a very bad combination if you want to conquer a country,” said Peter Mansoor, a retired army colonel and professor of military history at Ohio State University. At least for now, Putin’s forces have withdrawn from Kyiv, in eastern Ukraine. Eventually, the Russian leader may achieve some of his goals. However, his failure to capture Kyiv will be remembered for a long time – for how he defied pre-war expectations and revealed astonishing weaknesses to a military man believed to be one of the strongest in the world. “It’s amazing,” said Frederick Kagan, a military historian at the Institute for War Studies. On the first morning of the war, Russian Mi-8 attack helicopters were launched south of Kyiv on a mission to attack Hostomel Airport in the northwestern suburbs of the capital. Occupying the airport, also known as Antonov Airport, the Russians planned to build a base from which more troops and light armored vehicles would fly close to the heart of the country’s largest city. The story goes on It did not work that way. Several Russian helicopters were reported to have been hit by missiles even before they reached Hostomel, and as soon as they landed at the airport they suffered heavy artillery fire losses. An attempt to take control of a military air base in Vasylkiv, south of Kiev, also met with fierce resistance, and reportedly saw several Russian Il-76 heavy transport aircraft carrying paratroopers being shot down by the Ukrainian defense. Although the Russians finally managed to take control of Hostomel Airport, the fierce resistance of the Ukrainians in the area of the capital forced the reconsideration of an invasion plan based on the expectation that the Ukrainians would expand quickly, the West would sway and Russian forces would have easy fight. Air strike missions behind enemy lines, such as the one at Hostomel, are dangerous and difficult, as the U.S. military showed on March 24, 2003, when it sent more than 30 Apache attack helicopters to Iraq from Kuwait to strike. a division of the Iraqi Democratic Guard. On their way, the Apaches encountered light weapons and anti-aircraft fire that shot down one of the helicopters, caused damage to others and forced the mission to be canceled. Even so, the US military recovered from this setback and soon occupied Baghdad. The fact that the attack on Hostomel by the Russian Special Purpose Airborne Brigade of the Russian 45th Guard could not have stood out in retrospect if the wider Russian effort had improved from that point. But he did not. The Russians conducted small and unsuccessful searches in the heart of Kiev and later tried at great cost to encircle the capital by pulling the bow further west. Against huge odds, the Ukrainians held their ground and retaliated, blocking the Russians and effectively using a wide range of Western weapons, including Javelin handguns, Stinger anti-aircraft missiles and more. Last week the Russians left Hostomel Airport as part of a major retreat in Belarus and Russia. A side light of the battle for Kyiv was the widely told story of a Russian refueling truck that stretched tens of miles along a main road to the capital. At first it seemed a worrying sign for the Ukrainians, but they managed to attack elements of the escort, which had limited off-road capability and thus eventually disbanded or otherwise became inactive in battle. “They never really supplied any value to the Russian forces that were gathering around Kyiv, they never helped them,” said Pentagon spokesman John Kirby. “The Ukrainians stopped this escort very quickly, as they were very agile, hitting bridges, hitting lead vehicles and stopping their movement.” Mansoor says the Russians underestimated the number of troops they would need and showed “astonishing inability” to perform basic military operations. They misjudged what it would take to win the battle for Kyiv, he says. “This would be difficult even if the Russian army had proved capable,” he said. “It has been proven that he is completely incapable of waging a modern armored war.” Putin was not the only one surprised by the initial failures of his military. The Americans and other Western officials had realized that if the invasion took place, Russia’s seemingly superior forces would cross the Ukrainian army like a hot knife into the butter. They may occupy Kyiv in a few days and the whole country in a few weeks, although some analysts have questioned whether Putin estimated how much Ukrainian forces had gained from Western training intensified after Putin’s occupation of Crimea in 2014 and invasion of Donbass. On March 25, just one month after the invasion began, the Russians said they had achieved their goals in the Kiev region and would move to the separatist Donbas region in eastern Ukraine. Some suspected a ploy by Putin to save time without abandoning his maximalist goals, but within days Kiev’s retreat was fully visible. Putin may even be able to refocus his war effort on a narrower goal of expanding Russian control of Donbas and possibly securing a land corridor from Donbas to the Crimean peninsula. But its failure in Kyiv has revealed weaknesses that suggest Russia is unlikely to try again soon to overthrow the national capital. “I think they learned their lesson,” Mansoor said.
