Throughout the ongoing crisis, the government in India has carefully avoided taking a clear position. He abstained from any UN resolution on the issue and refused to join the international community in imposing economic sanctions on Moscow, prompting a warning from the United States that sanctions could be circumvented. Even statements from India condemning the alleged mass killing of Ukrainian civilians do not place any blame on anyone, but rather call for an impartial investigation. As a scholar of Indian foreign and security policy, I know that understanding India’s stance on the war in Ukraine is complex. To a large extent, India’s decision to avoid taking a clear stand stems from its dependence on Russia on a number of issues – diplomatic, military and energy.
Moscow as a strategic partner
This attitude is not entirely new. In a series of pressing global issues, India has long avoided taking a firm stand on the basis of its status as a non-aligned state – one of the countries that is not formally allied with any power bloc. From a strategic point of view today, New Delhi decision-makers believe they can not afford to alienate Russia because they rely on Moscow to veto any negative UN Security Council resolution on the current issue in the disputed region of Kashmir. Since the subcontinent was divided in 1947, India and Pakistan have fought three wars over Kashmir and the region remains a source of tension. Since the days of the Soviet Union, India has relied on Russia’s veto on the UN to protect itself from any negative statements about Kashmir. For example, during the crisis in East Pakistan in 1971 – which led to the creation of Bangladesh – the Soviets protected India from censure at the UN by vetoing a resolution calling for the withdrawal of troops from the disputed area. The story goes on In all, the Soviets and Russia have used the veto six times to protect India. India did not have to rely on Russia for a veto since the end of the Cold War. But with tensions for Kashmir still high amid sporadic clashes, New Delhi will want to ensure that Moscow is on its side if it comes to the Security Council again. To a large extent, India’s close relationship with Russia stems from the Cold War commitments. India was drawn into the Soviet orbit mainly in opposition to America’s strategic alliance with Pakistan, India’s mainland rival. India also hopes for Russian support – or at least neutrality – in its long-running border dispute with the People’s Republic of China. India and China share a border of more than 2,000 miles (nearly 3,500 km), the location of which has been disputed for 80 years, including a war in 1962 that failed to resolve the issue. Above all, India does not want Russia to side with China in the event of further conflict in the Himalayas, especially since the border dispute has resurfaced in 2020, with major skirmishes between the Indian Army and People’s Liberation Army of China.
Russia as an arms supplier
India is also heavily dependent on Russia for a range of weapons. In fact, 60% to 70% of India’s conventional arsenal is of either Soviet or Russian origin. Over the past decade, New Delhi has sought to significantly differentiate its arms acquisitions. To that end, it has purchased more than $ 20 billion worth of military equipment from the United States over the past decade or so. However, it is still unable to distance itself from Russia in terms of arms sales. On complex issues, Russia and India have developed close military-building ties. For almost two decades, the two countries have been co-producing the highly flexible BrahMos rocket, which can be launched from ships, aircraft or land. India recently received its first export order for the rocket from the Philippines. This defense link with Russia could only be severed at a significant economic and strategic cost to India. Also, Russia, unlike any western country, including the United States, was willing to share certain forms of weapons technology with India. Russia, for example, has leased an Akula-class nuclear submarine to India. No other country has been willing to offer India equivalent weapons, in part because of concerns that the technology will be shared with Russia. In any case, Russia is able to supply India with high-tech weapons at prices much lower than any Western supplier. Unsurprisingly, despite significant US opposition, India has chosen to acquire the Russian S-400 anti-missile defense battery.
Energy dependence
It is not just India’s defense industry that is based in Moscow. India’s energy sector is also inextricably linked to Russia. India has developed a civilian nuclear program since the George W. Bush administration ended India’s regime as a nuclear insurgency – a designation it used to test nuclear weapons outside the framework of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Although the sector remains relatively small in terms of total energy production, it is growing – and Russia has emerged as a key partner. After the 2008 US-India non-military nuclear deal allowed India to engage in regular civilian nuclear trade, Russia quickly signed an agreement to build six nuclear reactors in the country. Neither the United States nor any other Western country has been willing to invest in India’s civilian nuclear power because of a rather restrictive nuclear liability law, which states that the manufacturer of the plant or any of its components will be liable in the event of a accident. However, as the Russian government said it would take the necessary responsibility in the event of a nuclear accident, it was able to enter the nuclear power sector in India. Western governments, however, are reluctant to provide such guarantees to their trading companies. Far from nuclear power, India has also invested in Russian oil and gas fields. The State Oil and Gas Commission of India, for example, has long been involved in the extraction of fossil fuels off the island of Sakhalin, a Russian island in the Pacific Ocean. And given that India imports almost 85% of its crude oil needs from abroad – albeit only a small fraction from Russia – it is unable to shut down Russia. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken recently noted that “India’s relationship with Russia has been developing for decades at a time when the United States could not be India’s partner” and suggested that Washington was now ready to be the one. partner. However, given the diplomatic, military and energy considerations, it is difficult to see India deviate from its balancing act on Russia any time soon. [You’re smart and curious about the world. So are The Conversation’s authors and editors. You can read us daily by subscribing to our newsletter.] This article is republished by The Conversation, a non-profit news site dedicated to the exchange of ideas by academic experts. Written by Sumit Ganguly, Indiana University. Read more: Sumit Ganguly has received funding from the US State Department.
