A major US adversary selling a swarm of drones to another sounds like something out of a Tom Clancy novel – but will the move give Russia the leverage it needs to fundamentally change the course of its war in Ukraine? By all accounts, the drone market could have as much to do with desperation as it does with collusion. As much as the Pentagon and US officials fear countries like Russia, Venezuela, Iran, North Korea and others cooperating, the nature of this deal seems much more in the realm of opportunism from Iran and desperation from Russia than at the beginning of some great Iran-Russia engagement. Russia’s domestic drone program is weak, its industry is struggling to replace equipment losses, and Israel, Russia’s traditional drone partner, is distancing itself from both sides in the conflict. Since US-aligned drone manufacturers such as Turkey are unlikely to sell drones to Russia, only Iran has the domestic drone industry, interest in proliferation, and lack of concern about political backlash to withdraw such a move. Transporting hundreds of drones is a concern, but the types of drones being sent matter a lot. Iran makes dozens of different kinds of drones, from tiny kamikaze drones to the large strike platforms most people imagine when they think of drone warfare. A 2019 overview of Iran’s military by the US Defense Intelligence Agency noted that drones “are Iran’s most rapidly advancing air capability” and their drones can perform intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, fire munitions or hit a target and explode. More recently, they have demonstrated the ability to launch drones from surface vessels, which extends their strike range. Iran’s Army Chief Lt. Gen. Abdolrahim Mousavi and Iran’s Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces Lt. Gen. Mohammad Bagheri visit an underground drone site in an undisclosed location in Iran on May 28, 2022.
Iranian Army/WANA/Reuters
Sullivan’s announcement provided some hints about what kind of drones Iran might provide. US officials claim that Iran presented the Shahed-191 and Shahed-129 to a Russian delegation in June. Unlike Iran’s simple Kamikaze drones, which drop into their target and explode, the 191 and 129 are capable of long-range reconnaissance (ISR) and munitions, the latter resembling the infamous US MQ-1 Predator drone. While the worst-case scenario for Ukraine would be for Iran to transfer its most capable drones en masse to Russia, it is more likely that Tehran will want to protect its newer systems and send more expendable platforms. Specifically, the US statement said some of the drones were capable of weapons, such as those supplied by Iran to the Houthi rebels in Yemen. The Houthis have made excellent use of Iranian-supplied drones to attack military targets in Yemen, attempt to assassinate leaders at public events and attack Saudi oil facilities. According to the UN, the main systems used by the Houthis are the Ababil and Samad families, both of which have ISR capabilities and kamikaze variants, but are not as capable as the Shahed-191 and 129, which can conduct missions ISR, ammunition , and return for reuse. If Iran is already producing these cheaper systems in large quantities to supply to the Houthis, then it would not be difficult or risky for Tehran to sell many to Moscow while providing a smaller number of 191s and 129s. The big question is whether Iran’s drones are an indication that Russia does not have its own supply of drones. Artillery is key to Russia’s advancement, and drones with long-range strike capabilities will allow Russia to locate targets and correct artillery fire in real time. According to some estimates, Russia has lost dozens of its own ISR drones, such as the Orlan-10. At the same time, Iranian drones are no less impenetrable than Ukrainian anti-aircraft systems, raising the question of how much longer they will outlast the Orlans once deployed. A drone is launched during a large-scale drone combat exercise of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army, in Semnan, Iran on January 4, 2021.
Iranian Army/WANA/Reuters
It is also possible that drones could complement Russia’s long-range strike options to make their larger weapons more effective. The Houthis often claim to use their drones in concert with missiles, possibly to complicate Saudi air defenses. Russia’s own Kamikaze drone appears to be in short supply and lacks the range to strike targets deep in Ukraine. Kamikaze drones could prove a problem for Ukraine’s beleaguered air defenses, particularly when they get past the front lines. Overall, Ukraine is right to be concerned that Russia may now procure more drones from abroad, but there is a limit to how much damage they can do tactically, and they probably won’t make much of a difference strategically. But if Iran starts transporting more sophisticated UAVs, helps smuggle parts Russia lacks, or perhaps negotiates the sale of other weapons, such as missiles, all bets could be off.
